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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through
his Guardian, GEORGE A. DAVIS,
Appellant,
vs.
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
a corporation, and ROBERT S.
CLARK,
Respondents.

Case No.
7905

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only issue to be determined by this appeal is
whether the trial court erred in granting respondents' motions to dismiss appellant's complaint (R. 8
and 9).
The parties herein will be referred to hereafter
as they appeared in the court below, as plaintiff and
defendants, respectively.
The material allegations of the complaint are
substantially summarized in plaintiff's Statement of
Facts. However, some allegations of the complaint,
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which this defendant deems of great importance,
are not referred to at all by plaintiff.
It is alleged by Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's "First
Claim" that Provo City "caused barriers and signs
to be set up on the hill for the purpose of regulating
coasting and clearly marking the area as a coasting
area, and prior to the accident caused to be publicized
and advertised that this area had been established
as a coasting area and was under the direction of
the Provo City Recreation Department." (R. 3)
These allegations are in contradiction of Paragraph
4 to the effect that defendants Provo City and Brigham Young University, having knowledge, "did willfully and negligently fail to take any steps to guard
or protect the said children against injury." (R. 3).
By Paragraph 5 it is alleged that plaintiff collided
with an automobile of the defendant Clark being
operated by said defendant on Eighth North Street
(R. 4).
The foregoing allegations are substantially, if
not verbatim, repeated and set forth in plaintiff's
"Second Claim" (R. 4). There follows what plaintiff
has designated as his "Third Claim," in which it is
alleged, in substance, that the injuries to plaintiff
were the result of the negligence of defendant Clark
(R. 6).
Defendant Brigham Young University will
limit its presentation of the case to the allegations
of negligence or wrong-doing which are charged
against it by plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
1. THE LAW OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE HAS
NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS ALLEGED BY
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

2. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ALLEGES NO ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT,
BRIGHA~ YOUNG UNIVERSITY.
3. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOWS UPON ITS
FACE THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF WERE THE DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT
OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT, CLARK.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE. THE LAW OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

This court, in the case of Brown v. Salt Lake
City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, adopted as the law of
this jurisdiction the doctrine of the "turntable
cases." That case involved an action for wrongful
death brought against Salt Lake City for the death
of plaintiff's intestate. The deceased, a boy of eight
years met his death when he fell into a conduit which
conveyed the waters of City Creek Canyon into the
Jordan River. Access to this conduit was obtained
through a long, dark tunnel. It was shown by the
evidence that children were attracted to this tunnel
to play, that officers of the city knew of this childish
practice. Plaintiff asserted that the city was liable
because it negligently failed to guard the tunnel
entrance when it had knowledge of the presence of
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children. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff was
affirmed. The court made the following observation
regarding the application of the doctrine of attractive nuisance:

" * * * We are constrained to hold, therefore, that the doctrine of the turntable cases
should be applied to all things that are uncommon and are arti jicially produced, and
which are attractive and alluring to children
of immature judgment and discretion, and
are inherently dangerous,. and where it is
practical to guard them without serious inconvenience and without great expense to the
owner. * * * " (Italics ours.)
In adopting this rule, the court followed the case
of Peters v. Bowman (California), 4 7 P. 598. The
court in the Peters case, supra, made the following
statement of the principles to be applied to this type
of case, which this court specifically approved and
adopted:

'' * * * The owner of a thing dangerous
and attractive to children is not always and
universally liable for an injury to a child
tempted by the attraction. His liability bears
a relation to the character of the thing,
whether natural and common, or artificial
and uncommon; to the comparative ease or
difficulty of preventing the danger without
destroying or impairing the usefulness of the
thing; and, in short, to the reasonableness
and propriety of his own conduct, in view of
all surrounding circumstances and conditions.
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As to common dangers, existing in the order
of nature, it is the duty of parents to guard
and warn their children, and, jailing to do so,
they should not expect to hold others responsible for their own want of care. But, with
respect to dangers specially created by the
act of the owner, novel in character, attractive and dangerous to children, easily guarded
and rendered safe, the rule is, as it ought to
be, different. * * * " (Italics ours.)
Following the Brown case, supra, this court
decided the case of Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, 42
Utah 455, 131 P. 901, which was also a case involving
a claim for damages for wrongful death of a child
seventeen months old who was drowned when it
fell into an open ditch conveying the warm sulphur
waters of a natural spring. The claim was made by
plaintiff that the stream of water consituted an attractive nuisance. This court rejected this claim
and reversed a judgment in Plaintiff's favor. In
that opinion this court, at great length, discusses the
principles of the Brown case, supra. This court
points out that the thing causing injury, before it
can be classified as an attractive nuisance, must be
uncommon and novel, and furthermore points out
that a stream, such as the one involved in that case,
could not be an attractive nuisance because there
was nothing artificial about it, though probably
man-made. See also Peterson v. Farmers' Grain &
Milling Co., 69 Utah 395, 255 P. 436; Payne v. UtahIdaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 221 P. 568.
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The foregoing authorities are in harmony with
65 C. J. S. 465, Section 29 ( 7) to this effect:
"The attractive nuisance doctrine does
not apply to natural conditions, but only to
dangerous things or conditions artificially
created. It has also been held that the doctrine should not be extended to cases where
the thing or condition complained of is similar
to, or a reproduction of, nature. * * * "
See also Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 339, Clause (c), page 920, and comment on page
925, as follows :
'' * * * This does not require him (the land
owner) to keep his land free from conditions
which even young children are likely to observe and the full extent of the risk involved
in which they are likely to realize. * * * "

In 38 American Jurisprudence, Section 151,
Negligence, page 817, the following rules applicable
to "attractive nuisance" cases are set out:
" * * * However, one important condition
of the application of the doctrine of attractive nuisance is that the danger to the child be
caused by the attraction itself, or by something with which the attraction brings the
child in contact * * * but it doe~ not protect
a child, as against the owner of the premises,
in respect of a danger which was not incident
to the place, but was created by the child
himself with instrumentalities procured by
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him off the premises, or by a third person.

* * *
" * * * A danger which is not only obvious
but natural, considering the instrumentality
from which it arises, is not within the meaning of the attractive nuisance doctrine, for
the reason that an owner or occupant is entitled to assume that the parents or guardians
of a child will have warned him to avoid such
a peril. * * * "
With the foregoing rules in mind it is readily
seen that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Brigham
Young University was properly granted. An examination of plaintiff's complaint discloses no allegation of an affirmative act committed by this
defendant. It is alleged that Brigham Young University permitted Provo City to create the coasting
area, to post signs, warnings and barriers along and
at the foot of the hill. It is not alleged that any of
these acts were the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury. In that connection it is submitted that the
placing of signs and barriers did not render the
premises more hazardous than they were before this
was done. This action, on the contrary, rendered
the use of the hill less hazardous to plaintiff by giving
warning to the public of the fact that the hill was
designated as a coasting area from which notice the
traveling public would be under a duty to anticipate
its use by children. That it must be alleged before
this doctrine can apply that the owner created or
permitted the creation of a thing or condition which
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rendered his premises more hazardous than they
were before the artificial condition was created is
abundantly supported by the foregoing authorities.
Furthermore, it is respectfully submitted that' with
respect to this hill there was no artificial condition
created. The hill remained in the same natural condition that it had been in prior to its designation and
posting as a coasting area.
It is contended by plaintiff that the steepness of
the hill rendered it unfit for coasting because it was
apparent, or should have been apparent, that a sled
would be propelled out into a public highway and
could not be brought to a stop before entering the
highway. Precisely to guard against this danger,
Provo City, in recognition of said danger, posted the
signs and warnings for the general public. Therefore, it is submitted that the City, by its action, made
the situation less hazardous by providing such safeguards.
It is perfectly apparent from the complaint that
the injury to the plaintiff was not caused by any act
of Provo City or Brigham Young University in connection with the hill. Since the hill was changed in
no way, it remained as it was before in its natural
condition. The foregoing authorities support the
proposition that the attractive nuisance doctrine has
application only to instrumentalities or conditions
artificially created by act of the owner of the land
or of some other person or individual with his consent, and those things or conditions so created by
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the land owner n1ust be the proximate cause of injury to the child involved. Brown v. Salt Lake City,
supra; Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, supra. There being nothing uncommon, artificial or novel in the
situation refel'red to in plaintiff's complaint, the
doctrine can have no application.
On the face of the complaint it is apparent that
there were two forces which came into play, over
which Brigham Young University had no control,
which were the direct cause of injury and which had
no relation to the condition of the coasting hill. The
first of these was the act of the child himself who, by
the use of his own instrumentality, the sled, brought
by him upon the premises propelled him into a place
of danger where he was injured. The second of these
causes of injury was the action of the defendant,
Clark, over whom it is not alleged by the complaint
that Brigham Young University had any control
whatsoever and who operated his automobile along
the street where the collision with the sled occurred.
38 American Jurisprudence, Section 152, page 820,
supra.
The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply

to this case because the danger was an obvious and
natural one which the owner was entitled to assume
the child himself could see or about which the owner
could assume he had been warned by his parents.
Brown v. Salt Lake City, supra.; 38 American Jurisprudence, Section 151, page 818, supra; McHugh v.
Reading Co. (Pennsylvania), 30 A 2d 122.
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Finally, the doctrine does not apply where an
efficient responsible cause intervenes to break the
chain of causation set in motion by the negligence of
the land owner. Assuming, for the sake of argument, therefore, that Brigham Young University
might have been negligent, that negligence was
broken by the act of defendant, Clark, who, it is
alleged by plaintiff, negligently operated his automobile into a collision with the plaintiff. Arkans·as Valley Trust Co. v. Mcilroy (Arkansas), 133 S. W. 816:

'' * * * The testimony on the part of defendants tended to prove that when said Berg
left the fire it had about died out, and that
only in a low place where the grass was damp
it was still smoldering; and that the plaintiff
took some paper and ignited it at such smoldering fire, and with the lighted paper attempted to set on fire grass at another place
in the yard, and thereby ignited her clothes.
Such alleged act was an efficient intervening
cause which resulted in the injury. It was
not the probable and natural consequence of
the setting out of the fire by Berg, but was as
independent of it as if the child had set fire
to the paper with matches and therefrom had
ignited her clothes. For such act the defendants would not be liable, even though
Berg was negligent in setting out the fire.
* * * The act of the plaintiff in lighting the
paper and therefrom igniting her clothes
while she herself was attempting to set other
grass on fire was a new and independent force
which caused the injury, and the act of Berg
in setting out the fire would be too remote
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to be the cause thereof; and therefore no liability for the injury sustained under such
circumstances could be fastened upon the defendants even though Berg was negligent in
leaving the fire unguarded. * * * "
See also 38 American J U'tisprudence, Section
152, page 820, in which the following is said:
"The intervention of an efficient, responsible cause of an injury to a child relieves the
wrongdoer from responsibility for his negligence in maintaining an attractive nuisance
upon his premises. *· * * "
In his brief plaintiff confesses his inability
to discover a case where the doctrine of attractive
nuisance has been applied to the situation described
in the complaint now under consideration.
POINT TWO. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ALLEGES NO ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE AGAINST
DEFENDANT, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY.

Defendant Brigham Young University contends
that its Motion to Dismiss was properly granted by
the trial court for the reason that plaintiff's complaint fails to allege any act or omission on its part
constituting actionable negligence.
The complaint shows upon its face that if Brigham Young University was in fact negligent in any
one or more of the acts which have been charged
against it, such act or acts were not the proximate
cause of the injuries claimed to have been suffered
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
by plaintiff. It is elementary that negligence consists in doing or failing to do something which an
ordinary, reasonable person would do or refrain
from doing under the circumstances. It is likewise
elementary that before an act of negligence will sustain a claim for damages, it must be shown to be the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. Because of the uncounted number of times that these
propositions have been affirmed by the courts, it is
not deemed necessary to cite any authority for them.
In the light of these two propositions, an examination of plaintiff's complaint reveals an entire
absence of any action on the part of this defendant
which would sustain liability. All that plaintiff
contends so far as Brigham Young University is
concerned is that it permitted Provo City to create a
recreational coasting area upon its property for
children, that it permitted Provo City to place signs
and barriers along and at the end of its property
where it bounded on a public highway, notifying the
public that the area in question had been set aside
for coasting. The· most that can be said for the
complaint is that it alleges that the hill was unsuitable for coasting by children because it was steep
and because it was in proximity to a public street
along which it should have been apprehended automobiles, and particularly the automobile of the defendant Clark, would travel with the likelihood that
a collision might ensue between such an automobile
and a sled being used by some child. Such allegations are insufficient as basis for liability based upon
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claimed negligence. Plaintiff would have the court
hold that Brigham Young University was under a
duty to foresee a situation where an automobile.
driver would ignore the warning notices and disregard the barrier set up to protect the area and the
children which might be using it.
The law does not require one to anticipate that
a third party, acting independently and not under
the control of such person, will disregard his duty
to use due care or that he may violate the law, which
action might conceivably result in damage or injury
to another toward whom a duty may be owing. This
proposition is well illustrated in the decision of this
court in Davis v. Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 P. 920,
wherein this court said:
"But conceding that the defendant was
negligent in all the particulars complained of,
the question still remains, was the defendant's negligence the proximate cause of the
injuries? We think not. The plaintiff's own
testimony conclusively establishes that immediately before the accident, when he was in
the passageway, he appreciated and knew of
the closed section of the street. He had driven
his automobile over State Street but a day or
two before and had passed through the passageway. He remembered it, and, as he was
approaching the closed or barricaded section,
he followed the traveled track of vehicles
fully conscious of the fact that he was entering it. Unobstructed, there was ample room
for his automobile to pass in safety any apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proaching vehicle from the north or opposite
direction. Left standing unattended In the
passageway, without lights or other signals
of warning upon them, were the two wagons
of the Salt Lake Transfer Company, closing
it so that vehicles moving in opposite directions could not pass. As plaintiff entered the
passageway where the wagons stood he saw
an automobile with an unknown driver dashing through the passageway at a speed of not
less than 30 miles an hour. Plaintiff was
driving 20 miles an hour. A headon collision
was imminent, to avoid which he quickly
turned his machine into the wire of the barricade and was injured. Had the wagons not
been left standing in the passageway plaintiff
would have passed through in perfect safety.
Had the approaching driver not been driving
his machine at so reckless a speed no danger
would have confronted plaintiff, and he would
have had time to pass without accident. The
plaintiff so testified. The closing of the passageway by the wagons so that two vehicles
could not pass, and leaving them there without
signals and unattended through the night, and
the reckless speed with which the automobile
was driven through it by the unknown driver,
were the two contributing and the proximate
causes of the plaintiff's injuries, of neither
of which did the defendant have any knowledge, nor was he, under the circumstances,
in duty bound to anticipate.
"Admitting that the barricades were insufficient about the closed section of the
street, that they were left without lights or
proper signals of warning, yet the fact reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mains beyond any dispute, had it not been
for the wrongful acts of others in leaving the
wagons standing in the detour or passageway,
and the reckless manner in which the automobile driven from the north approached the
plaintiff, which, as we have pointed out, were
the sole proximate causes of the accident, the
plaintiff would have passed by the closed
section of the street without harm, regardless
of any act of omission or commission charged
against the defendant.''
As long as the actions of a party have no causal
connection in law with the injury there can be no
liability. Davis v. Mellen, supra; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Ralston, Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 62 Fed. 2d 1026. Among other statements,
the Ralston case supra quotes the following from
Wharton on the Law of Negligence, Section 134, to
this effect :
"Supposing that if it had not been for the
intervention of a responsible third party the
defendant's negligence would have produced
no damage to the plaintiff, is the defendant
liable to the plaintiff? This question must
be answered in the negative, for the general
reason that causal connection between negligence and damage is broken by the interposition of independent responsible human action.
I am negligent on a particular subject matter.
Another person, moving independently, comes
in, and either negligent1y or maliciously so
acts as to make my negligence injurious to a
third person. If so, the person so intervening
acts as a non-conductor, and insulates my
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negligence, so that I cannot be sued ~or th.e
mischief which the person so intervening directly produces. He is the one who is liable
to the person injured. I may be liable to
him for my negligence in getting him into
difficulty, but I am not liable to others for
the negligence which he alone was the cause of
making operative."
This case contains an excellent dissertation on
the subject of proximate intervening and efficient
cause.
See also Anderson v. Bransford, 39 Utah 256,
116 P. 1023.
No injury to the plaintiff would have occurred
if defendant Clark, by his actions, had not driven
his automobile either against or into the direct path
of the sled. There is no allegation in the complaint
which in any way indicates the injury would have
occurred without the intervening action of Clark.
POINT THREE. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOWS
UPON ITS FACE THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED
BY PLAINTIFF WERE THE DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT, CLARK.

The allegations of plaintiff's "Third Claim" directly charged defendant Clark with willful or negligent conduct resulting in injury to the plaintiff. It is
alleged that Clark knew or should have known of the
existence of the coasting area and that children were
using it when he drove his automobile~ so that it
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collided with plaintiff ( R. 6). There is no allegation
that this defendant knew of the proximity of Clark's
automobile and so knowing caused plaintiff to coast
down the steep hill, also knowing or having reason
to know and believe that there would be a collision.
Nor is there any allegation that this defendant had
any control over Clark or the operation of his car.
It is apparent, then, that his actions were not a concurring cause of the accident to plaintiff, even assuming this defendant should have taken steps to have
prevented plaintiff from coasting from its property
into a public street. Clark's actions were the direct,
proximate cause of the accident. Here was an independent, efficient cause beyond the control or knowledge of defendant Brigham Young University which
intervened and was the direct cause of injury. It
follows, therefore, that the chain of causation having
been broken by Clark's action, that any act of Brigham Young University, which might in any view of
the situation be construed as negligence, became, by
Clark's actions, no more than a remote cause, and
Brigham Young University is not liable to the plaintiff. See Southern Pacific Company v. Ralston,
supra, Davis v. Mellen, supra, Anderson v. Bransford, supra, Salt River Valley Water Users' Association v. Cornum (Arizona), 63 P. 2d 639.
CONCLUSION
Because the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege
facts which can support his contention that Brigham
Young University maintained on its premises or perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mitted to be maintained thereon an attractive nuisance, and because the said complaint likewise fails
to allege any fact charging actionable negligence
against the defendant Brigham Young University,
and finally because the plaintiff's complaint shows
upon its face that the proximate cause of the injurieS! sustained by the plaintiff, if any, was the
negligent action of the defendant Clark, the defendant Brigham Young University's Motion to Dismiss said cqmplaint was properly granted by the
trial court and the action of the trial court must be
sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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